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I N D E X

of

EXHIBITS

<u>Doc.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Def.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Pros.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For</u> <u>Ident.</u>	<u>In</u> <u>Evidenc.</u>
835-A	2437		Letter from General MINAMI, Jiro, Governor-General of Korea, to His Excellency the Foreign Minister UGAKI, Issei, dated 23 September 1938		20011

1 Wednesday, 16 April 1947

2 - - -

3
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
5 FOR THE FAR EAST
6 Court House of the Tribunal
7 War Ministry Building
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12 Appearances:

13 For the Tribunal, same as before.

14 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

15 For the Defense Section, same as before.

16 - - -

17 (English to Japanese and Japanese
18 to English interpretation was made by the
19 Language Section, IMTFE.)
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MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present
except TOGO, who the Sugamo prison surgeon says
is unable to attend the trial today through illness.
The certificate will be recorded and filed. The
accused TOGO is represented by counsel.

Mr. Comyns Carr.

- - -

J I R O M I N A M I, one of the accused, resumed
the stand and testified through Japanese inter-
preters as follows:

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

Q General MINAMI, it has been suggested to
me that you didn't hear the last document, which I
put to you, being read over the IBM. Is that so?

A I could not hear very well.

Q Well, perhaps you would like to look at
it then; would you?

MR. COMYNS CARR: May he have the original
of 195, please.

(Whereupon, the document above re-
ferred to was handed to the witness.)

Q (Continuing) Just look at it for yourself

CROSS

2 Tell us whether there is anything you want to
3 about it.

4 A I have glanced through the document. I
5 think this is a document in which an outline of
6 publicity policy has been laid out in case of an
7 emergency or some eventuality and it appears to me
8 that this was an internal arrangement between the
9 Chief of Staff and the Vice-Minister; and for that
10 reason, I do not recall this matter very well.

11 THE PRESIDENT: He recalls it, but not
12 very well, I take it.

13 Q But you told me yesterday that the Chief
14 of Staff sent it with your approval.

15 A If so, I was mistaken.

16 Q Do you mean that your Chief of Staff
17 would send a document of this kind to the Vice-War
18 Minister contrary to your instructions?

19 A That is so. The sending or exchanging of
20 such plans or ideas between the Chief of Staff and
21 the Vice-Minister is carried on internally between
22 themselves for the purpose of trying to seek a meet-
23 ing of minds on certain subjects. Thus, if any
24 document is sent in the name of the Commander-in-Chief,
25 then such document goes only to the Minister and not
to the Vice-Minister.

MINAMI

CROSS

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19 such plans or ideas between the Chief of Staff and
20 the Vice-Minister is carried on internally between
21 themselves for the purpose of trying to seek a meet-
22 ing of minds on certain subjects. Thus, if any
23 document is sent in the name of the Commander-in-Chief,
24 then such document goes only to the Minister and not
25 to the Vice-Minister.

1 Q Do you suggest that General NISHIO would
2 have put forward a document like this without
3 consulting it, without obtaining your approval
4 of the substance of it?

5 A The practice of such documents being sent
6 without the knowledge or approval of the Commanding
7 General frequently happens.

8 THE PRESIDENT: But he said he recalled it.

9 Q How do you recall it if it was sent without
10 your knowledge or approval?

11 A I do not understand the question.

12 Q You said a little while ago that you re-
13 called the document although not very well; that is,
14 remember it although not very well.

15 THE INTERPRETER: This is the Language
16 Section. Apparently there is confusion resulting
17 from a misinterpretation or misunderstanding of the
18 word "recall." That is, one has been taken from the
19 standpoint of recollection, the other from the stand-
20 point of calling the document back. We should like
21 of the prosecutor to put a new question so that
22 this confusion might be cleared up.

23 Q Did you not say a little while ago that you
24 remember this document although not very well?

25 A Inasmuch as I was unable to understand

MINAMI

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19 standpoint of recollection, the other from the stand-
20 point of calling the document back. We should like
21 of the prosecutor to put a new question so that
22 this confusion might be cleared up.

23 Q Did you not say a little while ago that you
24 read this document although not very well?

25 A Inasmuch as I was unable to understand

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1 what the document was about yesterday, I asked
2 that I be shown this document.

3 THE PRESIDENT: The word "recall" was first
4 used by the interpreter this morning as something
5 said by MINAMI.

6 MR. COMYNs CARR: Would the interpreter
7 kindly tell us whether when that word was used in
8 the first place by MINAMI the Japanese word meant
9 remember or something different?

10 THE INTERPRETER: It meant in connection
11 with recollection.

12 Q How do you recollect the document if it
13 was issued without your authority or knowledge?

14 A When the document was read yesterday, I
15 remembered a part of it, but not being quite familiar
16 with it, I asked that I be shown this document.
17 Having seen the document I said, as I have said before,
18 that such documents as these were frequently ex-
19 changed between the Chief of Staff and the Vice-
20 Minister in connection with matters which should be
21 taken -- action which should be taken in case of
22 emergencies or eventualities.
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1 Q That doesn't answer the question. How do you
2 remember it if it wasn't shown to you at the time
3 when it was issued?

4 A I felt that such things really happened
5 without having been told about the document yesterday.
6 Well, I felt that such a thing may have happened with-
7 out having been told of the document yesterday.

8 THE PRESIDENT: That answer cannot be
9 accepted. It is a direct contradiction of what he
10 said according to the interpreter this morning.

11 THE WITNESS: In short, I saw this document
12 with my own eyes for the first time this morning and
13 felt that this was a matter that was considered in
14 case of eventualities. At least it isn't a document
15 that I signed myself.

16 THE PRESIDENT: I think you ought to leave
17 it at that, Mr. Carr. We can form our own conclusions.

18 MR. COMYNS CARR: If your Honor pleases.

19 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

20 Q Now, General MINAMI, on page 16 of your
21 affidavit, paragraph 10, the last sentence, you are
22 speaking of what you did after you went to Korea,
23 and you say, "As Governor General, I have nothing to
24 say except that I devoted myself entirely to the
25 elevation of the status and conditions of the Korean

MINAMI

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1 people." Do you mean that you took no part in any
2 matters that were going on outside Korea?

3 A Exactly.

4 Q In your interrogation you said this:

5 "Q What members of the cabinet other than
6 the War Minister did you deal with?" That is when
7 you were in Korea. Was that correct?

8 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Comyns Carr, did you
9 read the answer to that question? If you did, we
10 did not hear it.

11 Q (Continuing) The answer was the words
12 beginning with "outside Korean affairs." "Outside
13 Korean affairs I had no dealings whatsoever with
14 members of the cabinet."

15 A That is so.

16 Q That answer is correct, is it?

17 A Correct.

18 Q And in the course of your interrogation
19 you also said this: "I might explain that in the
20 last fifteen years the thing I have been most against
21 was our war with China as I felt that the peace of
22 Asia could not be maintained unless Japan and China
23 remained at peace." Was that also correct?

24 A Yes, correct.

25 Q Now, who was your successor as commander in

MINAMI

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chief of the Kwantung Army?

1 A UEDA, Kenkichi; General.

2 Q UEDA, yes. At the end of July, 1937, did you
3 and UEDA send a written petition to the then Premier
4 KONOYE for the movement of establishing a new
5 administration in North China?
6

7 A 1937?

8 Q Yes.

9 A I did not sent.

10 Q Then if Premier KONOYE said that he had
11 received it what do you say to that?

12 A As far as I am concerned I do not recall
13 the matter at all. If shown a document I might, but
14 at the present time I have no recollection of it
15 because I was Governor General of Korea at the time.
16 That is 1937. And in the cabinet there was no other
17 minister except the Minister of Overseas Affairs who
18 had any dealings with me.

19 THE PRESIDENT: In the absence of some good
20 reason you should show him the document, if you have
21 it.

22 MR. COMYNS CARR: I haven't it, your Honor.

23 Q But I will show you, General MINAMI, another
24 document which I have got and that is prosecution
25 document 1835A. May the original be shown to the

MINAMI

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witness?

1 (Whereupon, a paper was handed to
2 the witness.)

3 THE PRESIDENT: What is the exhibit number?

4 Q (Continuing) Is that your letter?

5 MR. COMYNS CARR: It isn't at present an
6 exhibit, your Honor. I am seeking to make it one.

7 Q (Continuing) General MINAMI, you can tell
8 me whether it is your letter without waiting to read
9 it all.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Look at the signature or
11 seal. Is it yours?

12 THE WITNESS: I don't recall it very well.

13 THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean? Do you
14 recognize your signature or seal?

15 MR. COMYNS CARR: He doesn't have the earphones
16 on.

17 THE PRESIDENT: He used the word "recall"
18 again. He didn't understand it before; the interpreter
19 didn't understand it fully.
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1 Q Is that your signature or isn't it?

2 A I would not know unless I see the original.

3 (Whereupon, a paper was handed to
4 the witness.)

5 Q Look at that. Isn't that the envelope in
6 which it was sent?

7 A Yes, though not written by me. It was
8 written by somebody else. I should think it was
9 written by my secretary.

10 Q Oh, I see. Now, what we have here -- rather,
11 what has been shown to you is certified by the Japan-
12 ese Foreign Office to be a letter of six pages, dated
13 the 23rd of September, 1938 from you to Foreign
14 Minister UGAKI; isn't it?

15 A As I recall now, I think that something of
16 that kind might have happened, but I do not recall.

17 Q But isn't the document you have seen the
18 original -- your original letter?

19 A I do not think so.

20 Q Why not?

21 A Because I do -- somehow I do not recall it.

22 Q I am not asking you to recall anything. I'm
23 asking you whether the document you have been looking
24 at is your letter with your seal on it.

25 A Yes.

1 MR. COMYNS CARR: Then I ask that it be re-
2 ceived in evidence, your Honor.

3 THE PRESIDENT: It took a long time to get
4 that simple acknowledgment. It is admitted on the
5 usual terms.

6 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
7 No. 1835-A will receive exhibit No. 2437.

8 (Whereupon, the document above re-
9 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
10 No. 2437 and received in evidence.)

11 MR. BROOKS: May the defense be furnished
12 copies of this document, your Honor?

13 THE PRESIDENT: We so direct.

14 MR. COMYNS CARR: And may the witness retain
15 either the original or a Japanese copy so that he
16 can follow?

17 THE PRESIDENT: Give him the original. He
18 has a copy.

19 (Whereupon, a paper was handed to
20 the witness.)

21 MR. COMYNS CARR: (Reading)

22 "23 September 1938

23 "From: General MINAMI, Jiro, Governor-
24 General of Korea

25 "To: His Excellency, the Foreign Minister

1 UGAKI, Issei

2 "Sir:

3 "Approximately one year has passed since the
4 outbreak of the Sino-Japanese Incident. Through the
5 good policy of Your Excellency as Prime Minister" --
6 that is a mistake. It should be Foreign Minister --
7 "at a time when the situation is so extremely grave,
8 the prestige of our country is being enhanced at home
9 and abroad, and I feel it is a matter for congratula-
10 tions for the sake of our nation.

11 "Ever since the Incident our troops have been
12 invincible, and I believe Hankow, the last capitol of
13 the Chiang Regime, will soon be conquered.

14 "It is natural that the significance of the
15 fall of Hankow, in this Holy War, will have an ex-
16 tremely great influence at home and abroad. I feel
17 there are many measures to be taken by our nation at
18 this juncture, but the most important problem, I be-
19 lieve, is the recognition of a pro-Japanese Regime in
20 North and Central China simultaneously with the fall
21 of Hankow, and to expound it at home and abroad.

22 "The recognition of a pro-Japanese Regime by
23 our country will, internally, convince our people of
24 the progress of our policy in China; and externally,
25 give the Chinese masses a strong suggestion that there

1 is no other way than to get rid of the Chiang Regime
2 and depend on the new Regime, and at the same time
3 the third powers behind Chiang will also fully realize
4 that there is no other way than to approach the pro-
5 Japanese regime in order to protect their own rights
6 and interests. I believe it will have great effect
7 at home and abroad.

8 "I feel Your Excellency has already given
9 individual consideration to various measures to be
10 taken after the fall of Hankow, but it is my wish to
11 have Your Excellency make final judgment on this point.

12 "Yours respectfully"

13 THE MONITOR: During the reading, this wit-
14 ness said, "This is a fact."

15 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

16 Q Which part of it did you mean was a fact,
17 General MINAMI?

18 A All of it.

19 Q Well, now, so you were communicating with
20 ministers other than the Overseas Minister about
21 Korean affairs, were you not?

22 A Yes.

23 Q And, so far from your war with China being
24 the thing you were most against, as you told the in-
25 terrogator, you were here supporting it, were you not?

1 A At the time I was interrogated, I did not
2 have such a recollection. Having now seen such a
3 letter, I realized that I might have sent a letter,
4 and now I do confirm it. I was not constantly in
5 negotiation or having dealings with other ministers.

6 Q Yes, but now about your statement to the
7 interrogator that the thing you had been most against
8 for fifteen years was the war with China. How do you
9 reconcile that with this letter?

10 A I so replied at the time of the interrogation
11 because it had always been my view that it was highly
12 unfavorable and a disadvantage to fight a war with a
13 neighboring country, namely China.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Why did you call it a "Holy
15 War"?

16 THE WITNESS: I used the word because it was
17 in wide currency at the time.

18 Q What was holy about it?

19 A I never thought about that very deeply. I
20 used the word because it was in wide currency at that
21 time among the general public. My idea was, it was
22 not an aggressive war but hostilities which occurred
23 by unavoidable circumstances.

24 Q This letter was written some nine or ten
25 months after the rape of Nanking. You had heard all

MINAMI

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1 about that, hadn't you?

2 A No.

3 Q It had created a most unfavorable sensation
4 in the press of the whole world, hadn't it?

5 A Yes. There were reports in the press about
6 that incident, but I did not receive any detailed re-
7 ports on the matter.

8 Q Do you think that was holy?

9 THE PRESIDENT: In the great mass of evidence
10 we received, I do not think the word "holy war" was
11 used previously; but I am subject to correction.

12 Q General MINAMI, I notice that in your letter
13 one point you are stressing very much is the recogni-
14 tion of a pro-Japanese regime in North and Central
15 China. Now, that's just the very subject about which
16 I've been asking you in the last three points I've been
17 putting to you, and you've denied having anything to
18 do with it.

19 A There is a difference in time. It is a differ-
20 ent time entirely. There is no contradiction. This
21 was said after the China Incident had already broken
22 out. While Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army,
23 it had been my policy to prevent any such occurrence,
24 and I did not even conceive of such an incident break-
25 ing out.

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1 Q Now that you have seen this letter, do you
2 think your recollection may have been wrong about the
3 petition I asked you about, in July, 1937?

4 A 1937?

5 Q July, 1937. Didn't you join with UEDA in
6 sending that petition to KONOYE?

7 A I had no connection with UEDA at all. He was
8 with the Kwantung Army. I was in Korea.

9 Q Well, I'll leave that. Now, the next thing
10 I want to ask you about is this: On the 14th of May,
11 1941, while you were still Governor-General of Korea,
12 did you receive from Hitler the decoration of the
13 Grand Cross of the Eagle?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Is it right that you were only the third
16 Japanese who had ever received it?

17 A I do not know whether I was the third or the
18 fourth.

19 Q The other two being KONOYE and MATSUOKA; is
20 that right?

21 A I have heard of that, but I do not know
22 whether I was the third or fourth.

23 Q Now, what reason was given by Hitler for a-
24 warding you this decoration?

25 A I do not remember anything about a reason.

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The decoration was brought to me by the German Consul General in Dairen.

1 THE PRESIDENT: You might read the citation
2 to him if you have it.

3 MR. COMYNS CARR: I haven't it, your Honor.

4 Q What do you think, yourself, you had done to
5 earn this decoration from Hitler?

6 A It was strange to me.

7 Q Well, I'll leave it.

8 Now, while you were still Governor General
9 of Korea, in March of 1942, I am referring to prose-
10 cution exhibit 1973, was ITAGAKI Commander-in-Chief
11 of the Korean Army?

12 A Yes.

13 Q And was his Chief of Staff a man named IBARO?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Was IBARO a man in whom you had confidence?

16 A Having no direct relationship with him, I
17 would not say "confidence," but I knew him quite well.

18 Q As far as you know, is he a truthful person?

19 A Yes.

20 Q Now, listen to this telegram from him to
21 KIMURA, Vice-Minister of War, on the 1st of March,
22 1942, exhibit 1973, prosecution document No. 980-A.

23 THE MONITOR: Mr. Comyns Carr, are you going
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1 to read the entire document?

2 MR. COMYNS CARR: The headings and the first
3 paragraph.

4 Q (Continuing) "Army-Asia Secret,
5 "Received by the Army Secretariat, 4 March 1942
6 "Military Affairs Section"
7 Dated "1 March 1942, Secret Telegram - 2-28
8 "Operations Department, Korean Army
9 "Addressed to Vice Minister of War
10 "From the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army

11 "As it would be very effective in stamping
12 out the respect and admiration of the Korean people
13 for Britain and America, and also in establishing in
14 them a strong faith in victory, and as the Governor-
15 General and the Army are both strongly desirous of it,
16 we wish you would intern 1,000 British and 1,000
17 American prisoners of war in Korea. We wish you would
18 give us special consideration regarding this matter."

19 General MINAMI, was IBARO as truthful as
20 usual when he said you were strongly desirous of this?

21 A Probably there was some talk between IBARO and
22 the Chief of the Civilian Affairs -- the Director
23 General of Civilian Affairs, but I think the word
24 "desirous" is too strong a word. The opinion was
25 given that there was no objection to prisoners of war

MINAMI

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1 coming to Korea.

2 Q And the object, as stated in this document,
3 of sending them there, page 3, paragraph numbered 1:

4 "Purpose: It is our purpose by interning
5 American and British prisoners of war in Korea, to
6 make the Koreans realize positively the true might
7 of our Empire as well as to contribute to psychologi-
8 cal propaganda work for stamping out any ideas of wor-
9 ship of Europe and America which the greater part of
10 Korea still retains at bottom."

11 And on page 4, "The main points to be put
12 into force:

13 "(1) Prisoners of war, with the exception
14 of warrant officers and above, will be used in various
15 sorts of work in the principal cities of Korea, es-
16 pecially where psychological conditions are not good
17 in order to achieve the ends mentioned under I."

18 You knew very well, did you not, that those
19 were the objects of sending prisoners of war to Korea?

20 A There was no very definite objective as just
21 said. It was only that there were no objections to
22 prisoners of war being brought into Korea. Such
23 matters were outside the scope of my work -- such
24 concrete matters.
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1 Q Did the Chief of Staff inform you that KIMURA
2 had agreed to the proposal except that he suggested
3 that the buildings in which it was proposed to put the
4 prisoners of war were too good?

5 A No. Isn't that a negotiation as carried on
6 between the Chief of Staff and the Vice Minister of War?

7 Q Yes, and I am asking you whether the Chief
8 of Staff didn't inform you of the result?

9 A What do you mean by Chief of Staff?

10 Q IBARA.

11 A No. IBARA was not under my direct command.

12 Q Nobody has suggested he was. But I have asked
13 you the question whether he told you the result.

14 A He did not.

15 Q Did anybody?

16 A Yes, I heard.

17 Q From whom?

18 A It was said that there were no buildings in
19 which to accommodate prisoners of war, and the
20 Government General was asked whether he couldn't do
21 anything about providing buildings, and, therefore,
22 school buildings were just suggested by an official in
23 the Government General, and the report on that matter
24 was brought to my attention.

25 Q Namely, the report that the War Minister and

MINAMI

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1 the Vice War Minister thought they were too good for
2 prisoners of war?

3 A That I did not hear.

4 Q Did you find worse ones to comply with their
5 desires?

6 A That is not a work to be done by the
7 Government General.

8 Q Now, the prisoners didn't arrive until after
9 you had left Korea. Did you know what happened on
10 their arrival?

11 A I have not heard anything of it.

12 Q I will leave that, then. Now, when you got
13 back to Japan in May, 1942, you became a Privy
14 Councilor, didn't you?

15 A Yes.

16 MR. COMYNS CARR: I am now referring to
17 prosecution exhibit 687, your Honor.

18 Q Did you attend a series of meetings of the
19 council held between the 9th of October -- held almost
20 continuously from the 9th to the 21st of October, 1942,
21 about the Greater East Asia Ministry?

22 A I attended those meetings.
23
24
25

1 Q Yes. And was Admiral SUZUKI the committee
2 chief?

3 A Yes.

4 Q And on the 20th of October 1942, page 19 of
5 the exhibit, did you hear him say -- state to the
6 effect -- did you hear him state to the effect that
7 this draft was not based upon the rules of righteous-
8 ness but upon the rules of might? Do you remember
9 that as reported--

10 THE MONITOR: Just a moment, please. We
11 have to find the equivalent parts in the Japanese
12 text, otherwise it is absolutely impossible to give an
13 accurate interpretation.

14 MR. COMYNS CARR: It is the last of the meet-
15 ings on the 20th of October, page 19 of the English,
16 the third paragraph from the end.

17 THE MONITOR: Thank you, sir.

18 MR. COMYNS CARR: May I repeat?

19 THE MONITOR: Yes, please.

20 MR. COMYNS CARR: The paragraph in question
21 is the third from the end of the last meeting on the
22 20th of October, and it begins, "Committee Chief
23 SUZUKI stated to the effect--"

24 A Yes, I do remember that he said something to
25 that effect.

MINAMI

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1 Q Did you agree with him?

2 A Yes.

3 Q Nevertheless when Premier TOJO insisted on
4 the draft being adopted did you in common with all
5 the members of the Privy Council agree to it?

6 A I did not express any views or opinions, but
7 as an individual I was opposed to the establishment of
8 of the Ministry for Greater East Asiatic Affairs.

9 Q But did you acquiesce in it in spite of your
10 opinion?

11 A Because of the fact that many Privy Councilors
12 from the diplomatic field voiced opinions opposing the
13 plan, there was no need for me to add my opinions oppos-
14 ing the plan.

15 My foremost reason for opposing the establish-
16 ment of this ministry was--

17 Q Stop him. I haven't asked any question at all
18 about that, General MINAMI. I don't care what your
19 reasons for it were.

20 THE PRESIDENT: We must have what he said.

21 A (Continuing) My foremost reason for opposing
22 the establishment of the new ministry was that there
23 was no reason why such a ministry should be established
24 when there was already a Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
25 that it was a case of building one house on top of

MINAMI

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1 another.

2 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen
3 minutes.

4 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was
5 taken until 1100, after which the proceedings
6 were resumed as follows:)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.
3 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

4 Q General MINAMI, did you realize that the
5 Privy Council had a duty to give its honest advice
6 to the Emperor, whatever the Government might think?

7 A Yes.

8 Q And was attention drawn to that fact in
9 this very meeting by Councilors ISHII and OBATA?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Nevertheless, did you, in common with the
12 other councilors, pass this measure because the
13 government insisted upon it, although you were
14 opposed to it?

15 A Generally speaking, the Privy Council does
16 not directly interfere in the policy of the govern-
17 ment. At times the Privy Council expresses its
18 views and advice on government draft of plans, but
19 it does not absolutely oppose the government.
20 Therefore, counsel is given on the government plans
21 in order to avoid any possible mistakes or errors,
22 and generally speaking it is the custom of the Privy
23 Council to pass upon a plan, if it is not harmful,
24 by the vote of the majority, and if possible by a
25 unanimous vote. And, therefore, as OBATA and others

MINAMI

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1 said, although there would be individual opposition --
2 views expressing individual opposition, eventually
3 in the last plenary session the plan was passed.

4 Q And all the time you were a Privy Councilor
5 did you obediently pass all the measures the govern-
6 ment brought before you?

7 A With regard to this question, later on,
8 after the resignation of the TOJO Cabinet, the KOISO
9 Cabinet came into being, and I had occasion to
10 express my felicitations to one of my co-defendants,
11 the then Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU, upon his con-
12 current investiture as Minister of Foreign Affairs
13 and Minister for Greater East Asiatic Affairs, Mr.
14 SHIGEMITSU thanking me for my words of congratula-
15 tions. The reason for my congratulating Mr. SHIGE-
16 MITSU at that time was that at last by his holding
17 the two offices concurrently diplomacy had at last
18 come into its own again -- to its former position
19 of unity -- and that this was fully in keeping with
20 the expression of opposition that I had made
21 previously: that the creation of a new ministry
22 was nothing more than trying to butter bread on
23 both sides -- opposition view that I held. There-
24 upon, Mr. SHIGEMITSU immediately thanked me for the
25 words that I had expressed to him. That is all.

MINAMI

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1 Q Now, did you attend a meeting of the
2 Privy Council on the 18th of August, 1943? That is
3 exhibit 1275.

4 A I do not remember the date, but during my
5 tenure of office I attended all meetings of the
6 Privy Council.

7 Q Yes. Now, this was a meeting at which the
8 Council approved a treaty between Japan and Thailand,
9 as you called it, by which parts of Malaya were
10 handed over to Thailand?

11 A Yes.

12 Q Now, there was another MINAMI who was a
13 member of the Council besides yourself, wasn't there?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Was it you or he who asked a question at
16 that meeting as to whether this treaty was proper
17 under international law?

18 A That was MINAMI, Hiromu.
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MINAMI

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1 Q Did you hear TOJO answer to the effect --
2 the last sentence in the paragraph on page 3. It
3 begins, "Then MINAMI, a member of the committee."
4 I am only reading the last sentence -- I had better
5 read the whole of that paragraph, I am sorry:

6 "Then MINAMI, a member of the committee,
7 inquired what meaning such an action would have by
8 International Law. MORIYAMA, Director of the Bureau
9 of Legislation, replied that it was the popular opinion
10 according to International Law that occupying
11 nations had no territorial rights in occupied areas,
12 and therefore such treaties for territorial cession
13 in the occupied area should not be concluded. However,
14 on the other hand, as an occupying nation was conduct-
15 ing the administration for occupied areas, in other
16 words, military administration, and as there was no
17 special regulation stipulating that we should con-
18 tinue this condition forever, it should be perfectly
19 all right to agree that there would be no objections
20 to our abolishing the military administration in the
21 occupied area and letting a third power annex such
22 territories. He explained that the treaty between
23 Japan and Thailand would be concluded in this spirit.
24 A reply was made by Premier TOJO to the effect that
25 the Japanese Army already firmly believed that this was

MINAMI

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1 Japan's territory and that the measure for this
2 draft should be taken according to this firm con-
3 viction."

4 And then on page 4, the first paragraph
5 beginning:

6 "HAYASHI, a member of the committee, asked
7 whether the Government intended to consider such
8 measures provided in the Treaty as not being contrary
9 to International Law. Premier TOJO answered that
10 International Law should be observed so long as the
11 enemy observed it; but that International Law should
12 be interpreted from the viewpoint of executing the
13 war according to our own opinions, and that he con-
14 sidered the present measure as being perfectly justi-
15 fied by International Law."

16 Now, General MINAMI, you have told us that
17 you were a respector of international law.

18 Should I repeat my question?

19 A Please; briefly, please.

20 Q You have told us that you were a respector
21 of international law, have you not?

22 A Yes.

23 Q Were you shocked by those remarks of MORIYAMA
24 and TOJO?

25 A I wasn't particularly shocked but I might

MINAMI

CROSS

1 be saying something quite strange here but it
2 happens that I am very hard of hearing and that unless
3 a person in the Privy Council meetings came next to
4 me and spoke to me into my ears, otherwise I was sort
5 of a deaf-mute and I maintained a policy of silence;
6 and it was usual for me to not know what the question
7 was all about until after the transcript had been
8 put in writing.

9 Q Did you see this transcript in writing?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Were you shocked then?

12 A No.

13 Q May we take it then that your ideas about
14 international law are similar to those?

15 A Yes.

16 Q Now, only one other subject I want to ask
17 you about and that is this Greater Japan Political
18 Society. When the IRAA, Imperial Rule Assistance
19 Association, was formed all the political parties
20 were abolished, were they not?

21 A Yes.

22 Q That was in Prince KONOYE's time?

23 A I think that was so.

24 Q And in March of 1942 was the Imperial Rule
25 Assistance Political Society formed; is that right?

1 A No, not so.

2 Q What do you say is the correct fact about
3 that?

4 A Not the Imperial Rule Assistance Political
5 Society but the Japan Political Association was formed
6 on March 30, 1945.

7 Q Yes, but I am asking you about the Imperial
8 Rule Assistance Political Society. I should have
9 said May, 1942.

10 A That is something of which I am absolutely
11 unfamiliar. That is because I was then in Korea.

12 Q When the Greater Japan Political Association
13 was formed in March, 1945, was it not formed because
14 there had been troubles in those two other societies
15 and they were both abolished and replaced by your
16 society?

17 A I don't know the meaning but the Japan
18 Political Association was formed after the dissolution
19 of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society to
20 take the place of that society.

21 Q And also of the Imperial Rule Assistance
22 Association?

23 A That is an entirely separate question.
24 Political matters were handled by the Imperial Rule
25 Assistance Political Society but the Imperial Rule

MINAMI

CROSS

1 Assistance Association was a completely different
2 organization.

3 Q Did it not cease to exist at the same time?

4 A I do not think at the same time. I think
5 it was dissolved a little later. Eventually it was
6 dissolved.

7 Q And from the time when your Society was
8 formed was it not the only association of the kind
9 that was permitted to exist in Japan?

10 A Yes.

11 Q And were you not appointed its president by
12 or at the suggestion of the government?

13 A That is not so.

14 Q Who did appoint you?

15 A Influential representatives of various
16 political circles and parties such as the Minseito
17 and the Seiyukai recommended me as president of the
18 association; that is, people who were for a long time
19 active in politics.

20 Q But I thought you agreed with me that
21 those two bodies and all other political parties had
22 been abolished some years before?

23 A That is so; however, what I said was that I
24 was recommended to the office by various representative
25 people of various political circles. They don't belong

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1 merely -- they were not merely former members of
2 the Minseito or Seiyukai but various other political
3 parties and groups as well.

4 Q Was your appointment approved by the
5 government?

6 A There was no connection between me and
7 the government.

8 Q After your society came into being, did it
9 do both the work that had formerly been done by
10 the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the
11 work that had formerly been done by the Imperial
12 Rule Assistance Political Society?

13 A The work was entirely different.

14 Q Well, now, I want to read to you what you
15 said in your interrogation, exhibit 2207, page 2,
16 and I shall be reading from the second question
17 on that page to the bottom of the page.

18 "Q General, you stated that you were a mem-
19 ber and President of the Greater Japan Political
20 Association?

21 "A Yes.

22 "Q Now tell me: How long were you a member
23 of this society? I want the dates.

24 "A From 30 March 1944 until 15 August 1945.

25 "Q Now, you said that one of the principal

MINAMI

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1 aims of this society was to extend the Greater
2 East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?

3 "A Essentially that might be termed one of
4 its principal aims...

5 "Q How far did you want to extend this Co-
6 Prosperity Sphere? To what geographical limits?

7 "A Exactly as the Government had outlined.

8 "Q How was that?

9 "A Asiatics.

10 "Q To extend it over all Asia?

11 "A Yes.

12 "Q Under that you include India, Burma, the
13 Dutch Indies and the Philippines?

14 "A Yes.

15 "Q You weren't concerned with how the proper
16 sovereignties felt about India, Burma, the Dutch
17 Indies, China, or the Philippines?

18 "A Yes, I believed that Asiatics wished to
19 be freed of the yoke of foreign domination.

20 "Q General, you believed, then, in Asia for
21 Asiatics?

22 "A Yes."

23 THE WITNESS: There were two big mistakes
24 in the passages just read.

25 "Q What are they?

MINAMI

CROSS

1 A I think the first mistake was made by
2 the interpreter at the time. The correct date is
3 30th of March 1945; the Japanese text gives 1944.
4 Now it seems that I am made to have said that India
5 was included, but at the time of the interrogation
6 I laid particular emphasis on the point that India
7 was not included. Those are the two mistakes.

8 Q Why did you lay emphasis on that point,
9 as you say you did?

10 A I wanted to make clear the mistake that
11 appears in this interrogatory, because when the
12 prosecutor asked me the question "Was India included?"
13 I twice said "No"; and in spite of that, that mis-
14 take continued to appear in this document. That
15 is why I pointed out that mistake. The period in
16 which I served as president of the Japan Political
17 Association is a very important one and that is
18 why I took special occasion now to point out the
19 mistake; and after hearing the document read, that
20 mistake was just as I had anticipated.

21 I said that the date was very important
22 because I held this office less than half a year,
23 only about five months up to -- before and up to
24 the termination of the war.

25 Q General, you said that you believed

MINAMI

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1 Asiatics wished to be freed of the yoke of foreign
2 domination. Did you believe that they wished to
3 exchange it for the yoke of Japanese domination?

4 A That is not so, absolutely not so, because
5 the past history of these countries was one of in-
6 fluence and domination by other outside Western
7 Powers. I said that they should be liberated and
8 that is how I believed.

9 Q Did you think that they wished to exchange
10 it for a system such as that which prevailed in
11 Manchukuo?

12 A That wasn't my idea.

13 Q Why not?

14 A My point was that Asia should be freed and
15 free. I had no idea in my mind of connecting Man-
16 chukuo with this matter, that is, to follow the
17 pattern set in Manchukuo.

18 Q But I thought you told me that Manchukuo
19 was independent and equal.

20 A Yes, I always had the belief -- entertained
21 the belief that Manchukuo was a peaceful area in
22 the Orient.

23 MR. COMYNS CARR: That concludes my cross-
24 examination, your Honor.
25

MINAMI

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2 domination. Did you believe that they wished to
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13 Q Why not?

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16 chukuo with this matter, that is, to follow the
17 pattern set in Manchukuo.

18 Q But I thought you told me that Manchukuo
19 was independent and equal.

20 A Yes, I always had the belief -- entertained
21 the belief that Manchukuo was a peaceful area in
22 the Orient.

23 MR. COMYNS CARR: That concludes my cross-
24 examination, your Honor.
25

MINAMI

1 THE PRESIDENT: I have a number of questions
2 to put on behalf of a Member of the Tribunal. I
3 may have other such questions. Whether a question
4 by a Member of the Tribunal can be objected to
5 and ought to be objected to are matters to be
6 decided in Court. I have not read these questions,
7 and I assume there is nothing objectionable in them;
8 but they should be put before the re-examination.

9 BY THE PRESIDENT:

10 Q Witness, in exhibits 691 and 703 are
11 mentioned operation plans called "otsu", thirteen
12 plans which were made for a war against the U.S.S.R.
13 and plans "Hei-C" plan against China. Who made the
14 plan "otsu" when you were Commander-in-Chief of
15 the Kwantung Army and who adopted the plan "otsu"
16 for the Kwantung Army while you were in command of
17 it?

18 MR. BROOKS: Mr. President, can we have
19 the witness shown those exhibits on a matter of
20 that importance so there is no mistake?

21 THE PRESIDENT: Show him the exhibits, please.

22 (Whereupon, some documents were handed
23 to the witness.)

24 A May I reply? Operations plans are made in
25 the General Staff Headquarters annually in peacetime

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1 and in accordance with conditions and situations in
2 wartime; and those operations plans are shown to all
3 divisional commanders and other commanders throughout
4 the country. The various armies formulate their
5 own plan of operations by applying the general
6 staff plan so that they would be in accordance with
7 each other. And I believe that the plans as shown
8 on the photostats which I have seen were studies
9 made on the basis of those plans.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Who made the plan "otsu"
11 and who adopted the plan "otsu"?

12 A In the Kwantung Army the Kwantung Army
13 plan of operations was formulated by the staff
14 officer in charge of operations in accordance with
15 the plan of the General Staff; but I do not know
16 who did it -- who made it. If the matter is looked
17 into, I should think it was formulated by the staff
18 officer in charge of operations in the Kwantung
19 Army.

20 Q Who adopted it?

21 THE INTERPRETER: The Witness is asking may
22 he be shown those documents again?

23 (Whereupon, some documents were handed
24 to the witness.)

25 A While I was in the post of Commanding General

MINAMI

1 of the Kwantung Army I think the staff officer in
2 charge of operations plan was replaced once, and
3 so there were two men. Well, I can't tell by looking
4 at these photostats, but in any event the plan
5 was drawn up by the staff officer in charge of
6 operations in the Kwantung Army in accordance with
7 the principles as laid down by the General Staff
8 Headquarters in Tokyo.

9 Q I asked who adopted the plan. I have got
10 no answer that I have heard.

11 Who adopted the plan?

12 A In the Kwantung Army it is naturally the
13 Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army who carries
14 out such responsibility.

15 Q Do you know well the terms of the Portsmouth
16 Agreement concluded in 1905 between Russia and Japan?

17 A I am not familiar.

18 Q Are you familiar with the contents of the
19 Pekin Convention of 1925?

20 A I do not know.

21 Q Do you know that Japan under the Portsmouth
22 Treaty considered Manchuria an integral part of the
23 Chinese territory?

24 A I should think -- I think that there was
25 something of that nature.

MINAMI

1 Q Article Three of the Portsmouth Treaty
2 reads: "Russia and Japan undertake to evacuate
3 completely and simultaneously Manchuria except
4 the territory upon which extends the least of
5 the Liaotung Peninsula.." Do you know that?

6 A Yes.

7 Q "...and to restore to the rule of China
8 wholly and completely all the parts of the Man-
9 churian territory that are at present occupied by
10 Russian or Japanese troops or under their control."
11 Did you know that?

12 A Japan was not in occupation of Manchukuo.
13 In accordance with the Japan-Manchukuo protocol
14 Japan merely stationed her troops there.

15 Q Do you believe now and did you believe
16 earlier that Manchuria constitutes an integral
17 part of China and that any violation of the economic
18 and territorial integrity of Manchuria is a violation
19 of the sovereign rights of China?

20 A Because the State of Manchukuo was founded
21 in accordance with the will and wishes of the people
22 of Manchuria, the idea was that it was separate from
23 China and that is how I now believe.

24 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until
25 half-past one.

(Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was
taken.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

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3 The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at
4 1330.

5 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
6 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Counsellor OKAMOTO.
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9 J I R O M I N A M I, one of the accused, resumed
10 the stand and testified through Japanese inter-
11 preters as follows

12 MR. T. OKAMOTO: There has been a mistake
13 which I should like to call to the attention of the
14 Tribunal. May I speak in Japanese so that the accused
15 may hear?

16 Just before the noon recess the accused's
17 attention was called to exhibit 691 and 703, but the
18 actual document which was shown the accused was 698,
19 photostats, document 698. I should like to have the
20 witness be shown the documents actually in question
21 in its original. Especially with reference to exhibit
22 703 I should like to ask the witness to give special
23 attention to the second from the last question on the
24 sixth page of the Japanese text, and I should also
25 like to have the witness give particular attention in

MINAMI

1 exhibit 691 to the name of the sender and to the name
2 of the one giving instructions to the sender.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Well, let him look at exhibit
4 691 and then 703.

5 (Whereupon, the documents above
6 referred to were handed to the witness.)

7 THE PRESIDENT: The second to the last ques-
8 tion on page 6 of the Japanese text.

9 MR. T. OKAMOTO: Speaking about page 6 of
10 the Japanese text, I am referring to Japanese copies
11 but not the original so may I show him the copy?

12 THE WITNESS: I did not quite understand.
13 Will the interpreter repeat that last statement.

14 (Whereupon, the last statement was
15 reinterpreted.)

16 THE WITNESS: Now I understand. I understand
17 now.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Well, have you anything to
19 add to your previous answers?

20 THE WITNESS: The operations plans which were
21 referred to this morning I did not quite understand
22 at the time. Now that I have seen these documents I
23 now understand that these were operations plans of the
24 time when I was Commander in Chief of the Kwantung
25 Army. This is a plan formulated by the general staff

MINAMI

1 headquarters, and the plan itself was actually drawn
2 up by the Chief of the Division of Operations of the
3 staff headquarters, and following that received the
4 Imperial sanction. That is all.

5 BY THE PRESIDENT:

6 Q Look once more at exhibit 698.

7 MR. BROOKS: Did the Court say 698? He has
8 691 in his hands, sir.

9 Q (Continuing) Did you read that document for
10 the first time in 1928 when you were vice-chief of the
11 Army General Staff?

12 A I do not recall that.

13 Q Do you regard as lawful from the viewpoint
14 of international law the actions of a state, a neighbor
15 of China, which, without the consent of the Chinese
16 Government and eventually against its will, would
17 seize Manchuria with the help of its troops and estab-
18 lish control there regardless of the reasons for doing
19 so, whether to support the independence movement or
20 to create a military base for the defense against
21 another state?

22 A To do so with the help of another country,
23 that I feel is unlawful. But it is my interpretation
24 that if the State of Manchukuo is founded in accordance
25 with the will and desire of the people of Manchukuo

MINAMI

1 that is an internal affair of Manchuria which is
2 outside the scope of our function. It is a matter
3 with which we cannot interfere in.

4 Q Do not such actions constitute a violation
5 of the territorial integrity of another state?

6 A It would be in violation of international
7 law if Manchuria declared its independence from China
8 with Japanese help and the help of Japanese troops.

9 THE INTERPRETER: With the help of a foreign
10 country, in this case Japan and Japanese troops.
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1 Q Do you believe now that Japan violated
2 the Portsmouth Treaty when its troops marched into
3 Manchuria against the will of the Chinese Govern-
4 ment?

5 A No.

6 Q Did you attend the conference of the Privy
7 Council on the 12th of October, 1942 when TOJO as
8 Premier in answer to a question asked by UENO stated
9 that all the territories occupied by the Japanese
10 troops would be incorporated into the Greater East
11 Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and that the latter would
12 expand along with conquests?

13 A May I have the date repeated?

14 Q The 12th of October, 1942.

15 A Yes, now I understand. As I have said
16 before, because I was extremely hard of hearing I
17 saw the minutes of these meetings in writing after-
18 wards. I then thought, when I saw the record of the
19 proceedings in writing, that it was a little extreme
20 but I was not particularly shocked by it -- I was
21 not greatly shocked by it.

22 Q Do you adhere to the viewpoint on Greater
23 East Asia and do you support the idea that Japan
24 ought to rule over all the nations that make part
25 of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?

MINAMI

1 A I do not.

2 Q How do you regard this doctrine now as
3 well as the policy of Japan, the aim of which is
4 that Japan should rule over the whole world and that
5 the Japanese Emperor should be Emperor of the whole
6 world?

7 MR. BROOKS: Mr. President, before the
8 Tribunal gets too far from the question asked about
9 what was said at the committee meeting, I believe
10 the prosecutor brought out that that was Hiromu
11 MINAMI. It was not clear. He questioned the witness
12 on that and I don't think the witness understood your
13 question. I think he said he was shocked by it.
14 Would the Court mind before leaving that clearing
15 the point up if that is true?

16 THE PRESIDENT: He said he read it and he
17 was not greatly shocked.

18 MR. BROOKS: I definitely understood the
19 President to ask if he made the statement though,
20 and that was what the prosecutor was clearing up.

21 THE PRESIDENT: No, I did not.

22 MR. BROOKS: I misunderstood you, sir. I
23 am sorry, I misunderstood your question.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Will you answer the last
25 question, please. The Japanese shorthand writer will

MINAMI

1 repeat it, please.

2 (Whereupon, the last question
3 was read by the Japanese Court Reporter.)

4 A I think that it is entirely wrong. The
5 idea of ruling the world is an entirely mistaken
6 notion.

7 Q Well, the next question I had to ask
8 is based on the assumption that you answered other
9 questions in a certain way, so I am not asking it.

10 MR. BROOKS: Are there any further questions,
11 your Honor?

12 THE PRESIDENT: That is all.

13 MR. BROOKS: As I understand under our
14 rules of procedure if any other counsel has any cross-
15 examination of this witness as a hostile witness
16 it should be done now; otherwise, that after the
17 redirect -- the general redirect examination, if the
18 witness is treated as not a hostile witness but there
19 are matters specifically relating to his client not
20 covered by the general redirect examination, that
21 they will follow at that time; is that correct, your
22 Honor? I am referring to paragraph five of our rules
23 of procedure, your Honor. That is our understanding.

24 THE PRESIDENT: I will read paragraph five:

25 "Upon the completion of all cross-examination,

MINAMI

1 without the special permission of the Tribunal,
2 redirect examination shall be conducted by the
3 counsel who conducted the general direct examination."

4 MR. BROOKS: I will send the Language
5 Section up my copy of that, your Honor. If you
6 want to read the rest of it it will save time.

7 THE PRESIDENT: (Reading continued)

8 "Other counsel for individual accused may
9 examine a witness on redirect examination only
10 on matters specifically relating to his client and
11 not covered by the general redirect examination."
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MR. BROOKS: We also asked in court the other day that, where the English affidavit is read by the American counsel, the Japanese counsel be allowed to handle the redirect examination. I do not care for American counsel to handle the redirect examination since Mr. OKAMOTO, the Japanese counsel for the witness MINAMI, has requested that he be allowed to handle the redirect examination. I will not examine. I will turn it over to him, if the Court so judges.

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(Whereupon, a discussion off the record was had by the Members of the Tribunal.)

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THE PRESIDENT: By a majority the Court allows counsellor OKAMOTO to reexamine.

MR. BROOKS: Thank you, your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. T. OKAMOTO:

Q General MINAMI, are you able to hear my voice?

A Yes.

Q This morning, in answering, you said quite often that "I do not remember well." When you said that, were you speaking in Kansai dialect and thus meant "I do not remember at all," or did you mean

1 that "I did not remember very well -- remember little
2 but not remember very well."?

3 THE PRESIDENT: What he said was very clear.
4 It is not ambiguous. He is not at liberty to ex-
5 plain the obvious.

6 MR. T. OKAMOTO: In Japanese there are many
7 dialects, and I wanted to make that quite clear; but
8 I shall turn this matter over to the Language Section.

9 Q The President of the Tribunal asked you
10 about the Portsmouth Treaty. Now, the stationing of
11 troops in Manchuria, was that in accordance with the
12 Portsmouth Treaty or not -- or any other treaty, do
13 you know?

14 A I thought that it was in accordance with the
15 Portsmouth Treaty.

16 Q At this point I would like to call the
17 attention of the Tribunal to exhibit 2298 -- prose-
18 cution document No. 2298.

19 (In English) No: Exhibit No. I shall read
20 it:

21 "ADDITIONAL ARTICLES" to the Portsmouth
22 Treaty, defense document No. 59. I shall read just
23 a paragraph:

24 "ADDITIONAL ARTICLES Signed at Portsmouth,
25 September 5, 1905."

1 Paragraph 3 of item 1:

2 "The High Contracting Parties reserve to
3 themselves the right to maintain guards to protect
4 their respective railway lines in Manchuria. The
5 number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per
6 kilometre and within that maximum number, the com-
7 manders of the Japanese and Russian Armies shall, by
8 common accord, fix the number of such guards to be
9 employed, as small as possible having in view the
10 actual requirements."

11 What you have just referred to, witness, as
12 the Portsmouth Treaty, was it this or something else?

13 THE MONITOR: Was it this provision or some
14 other provision?

15 A That is what I thought of -- that provision.

16 Q In answer to an interrogation by the prose-
17 cution you said that you could have stopped the ac-
18 tions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army;
19 but, in actuality, in reality, you could not.

20 THE MONITOR: The first part is not "you
21 could have," but "I could stop it, but I could not
22 stop it."

23 Q How much could you limit the actions of the
24 Kwantung Army as War Minister?

25 THE PRESIDENT: That is already covered.

MINAMI

REDIRECT

1 MR. T. OKAMOTO: I think that the answer
2 to that question is very unclear and contradictory,
3 so I wish to have it made clear.

4 A The Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army
5 could be restrained in case his actions were con-
6 trary to government policy and by denying -- or when
7 they wasted expenditures.

8 Q I could not understand very well your second
9 answer -- second point.

10 A That is, the War Minister rejects giving
11 funds to the Kwantung Army for -- to carry on its
12 actions.

13 THE MONITOR: Mr. President, we have trans-
14 lated as accurately as we can the witness' reply.
15 However, it is not logical -- I mean, the answer is
16 not logical.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Give his answer. We are
18 not concerned about the logic of it yet.

19 Q I shall change the wording of the question.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Give his answer. We are
21 the judges of logic, not the interpreters.

22 THE MONITOR: I meant by "logic", it is un-
23 translatable into a regular sentence.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Make the best you can of it.

25 THE MONITOR: Yes, sir.

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REDIRECT

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2 to that question is very unclear and contradictory,
3 so I wish to have it made clear.

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21 the judge of logic, not the interpreters.

22 THE MONITOR: I meant by "logic," it is un-
23 translatable into a regular sentence.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Make the best you can of it.

25 THE MONITOR: Yes, sir.

1 A The Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army --
2 the actions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung
3 Army can be controlled or restrained in case such
4 action is contrary to government policy by denying --

5 THE MONITOR: "Can be controlled or when the
6 Kwantung Army denies the expenditure." And Japanese
7 counsel followed that by "What did you mean by that?
8 Who denies that?" And the witness replied, "The
9 Kwantung Army -- the War Minister denies it." That
10 is all, sir.

11 Q Was the War Minister a superior officer to
12 Commander-in-Chief HONJO?

13 A The War Minister is not a superior officer
14 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, but
15 he has the right of command in connection with mat-
16 ters pertaining to personnel, expenditures and with
17 regard to the enforcement of discipline and morals.

18 THE MONITOR: Not "the right of command,"
19 but "the right to take part in the disposition of
20 matters with regard to personnel, discipline and
21 morals and expenditures.

22 A (Continuing) In other words, he has the
23 power to participate in the disposal of matters per-
24 taining to military administration.

25 Q With regard to the action taken by Commander-

1 in-Chief HONJO on the night of the 18th of September,
2 could you, as War Minister, be in the position to
3 deal with it or not -- were you in any position to
4 punish the commanding general or not?

5 A The incident which occurred on the night of
6 September 18, being an unexpected and sudden one, the
7 Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army carried out
8 his duties and exercised the right of self defense.
9 In view of that fact, he was not punished.

10 Q Did you have the authority to punish him?

11 A No.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Why did the Emperor punish
13 him?

14 Mr. Comyns Carr.

15 MR. COMYNS CARR: The witness told me quite
16 clearly that he could have recalled General HONJO,
17 but he didn't because he approved of his action. In
18 view of that, I must object to an attempt to get him
19 to change his answer.

20 THE PRESIDENT: The function or the purpose
21 of redirect examination is not to eliminate contra-
22 dictions but to remove obscurities.

23 MR. T. OKAMOTO: Yes, your Honor.

24 Q In answer to an interrogation by the prose-
25 cution you said you approved of the actions of General

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1 HONJO. Now, did you mean that you approved of his
2 actions as War Minister or that the government ap-
3 proved -- that the cabinet approved of his actions.

4 THE PRESIDENT: That was not left in doubt.

5 Q Why did you approve of the actions of
6 General HONJO?

7 A It was recognized because the Kwantung Army
8 was, as much as possible, acting in accordance with
9 the government's policy of non-extension of the inci-
10 dent and because, in accordance with his official
11 responsibilities, was exercising its right of self
12 defense; and this was recognized both by the govern-
13 ment and by the Supreme Command.

14 Q After the Commander-in-Chief of the Chosen
15 Korean Army -- that is, the army -- the Chosen Army
16 crossed the border of Chosen, did the Commander-in-
17 Chief of the Chosen Army send any message of that
18 effect to Tokyo?

19 A Yes, he made a settlement of the matter
20 voluntarily. He sent to the Emperor an inquiry
21 whether he should remain or resign.

22 Q What steps were taken with regard to that
23 matter?

24 A The commanding general of the Korean Army,
25 being an official of the Shinnin rank, the War

1 Minister does not have any authority to punish him.
2 That is, in other words, he was an official of the
3 rank -- was personally appointed by the Emperor.
4 And, with regard to his actions, the Emperor person-
5 ally reprimanded him.

6 THE PRESIDENT: A colleague would like the
7 following question to be put: As the Emperor approved
8 the sending of troops from Korea to Manchuria, was
9 the government able to refuse funds for paying the
10 expense?

11 THE WITNESS: If sanctioned, the government
12 could not but approve of expenditures -- could not
13 prevent the defraying of expenditures.

14 Q With regard to the crossing of the Chosen
15 border by Chosen Army, was this under the command of
16 the Supreme Command or the War Ministry --

17 THE MONITOR: No: With regard to the ex-
18 penditure incurred in the crossing of the border,
19 was this expenditure approved by the Supreme Com-
20 mand or by you -- requested by the Supreme Command or
21 by you, the War Minister?

22 A Requests for such funds are made by the
23 Chief of the Army General Staff. But, in connection
24 with the funds, the War Minister inquires of the
25 Chief of Staff and ascertains the amount of money

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1 required for any particular purpose. And, after
2 obtaining such information, the War Minister brings
3 the matter up to the meeting of the cabinet, and
4 there the matter is thoroughly deliberated upon and
5 thrashed out.

6 The matter was reported by the War Minister
7 to the cabinet and there asked for the Prime Minister's
8 approval. The amount approved, as I now recall, for
9 that purpose was drawn from the second reserve fund,
10 and the amount was nine million, six hundred thousand
11 yen.

12 Q Who was it, during the cabinet session,
13 urged that a League Commission of Inquiry be in-
14 vited to Manchuria; who were the people?

15 A That was Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA. And,
16 first of all, Baron SHIDEHARA asked me, "What do you
17 think of the idea?" I agreed with Baron SHIDEHARA
18 heartily on the plan and said that I welcomed the
19 coming of the inquiry commission, the reason being
20 that, as far as I was concerned, we should not create
21 any misunderstanding abroad that Japan was engaged
22 in something -- that Japan was up to something in
23 Manchuria and that it was highly proper if members
24 of the League of Nations could come personally to
25 see the actual conditions on the spot. The cabinet

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1 immediately approved of this plan.

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1 Q Wasn't there anyone who objected to this plan?

2 A No one opposed.

3 Q With regard to the dispatch of troops to
4 Chientao, was that in accordance with your order as
5 War Minister, or by the order of the Chief of the Army
6 General Staff?

7 A The dispatch of troops to Chientao was done
8 in accordance with an Imperial command order by the
9 Chief of the Army General Staff. But actually I re-
10 quested the Chief of Staff to do so; that is, I, too,
11 requested the Chief of Staff to do so. I counseled
12 the Chief of the Army General Staff because I felt
13 it was highly necessary for the maintenance of law and
14 order in Chientao inasmuch as the majority of the popu-
15 lation, that is to say about sixty per cent of the
16 entire population of Chientao was composed of Koreans.

17 THE MONITOR: Over sixty per cent.

18 Q Do you remember the number of troops?

19 A Being in accordance with peace time organiza-
20 tion, one company of peace time organization, I should
21 think the number was somewhere between 120 to 130 men.

22 Q You said that you had heard many rumors con-
23 cerning ITAGAKI and ISHIWARA. Did you ever conduct an
24 investigation to see if these rumors were true or not?
25

A Yes, I did.

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1 Q What kind of investigation?

2 A The investigation was carried on with an
3 extremely careful attitude, and consultations were
4 previously held on the matter with the Chief of the
5 Army General Staff. One is that NINOMIYA, Vice-Chief
6 of Staff -- a party made a trip with Vice-Chief of
7 Staff NINOMIYA as its head, a party of experts headed
8 by NINOMIYA, Vice-Chief of Staff.

9 Another party of investigation was ordered by
10 me with its leader being General SHIRAKAWA.

11 I personally ordered another investigation
12 party headed by Major General HASHIMOTO, Toranosuke,
13 including various capable representatives from the
14 War Ministry, the Army General Staff office, and the
15 Inspectorate General of Military Education.

16 Q What were the results of that investigation?

17 A With regard to the NINOMIYA investigation party
18 I did not personally and directly get any reports be-
19 cause it was a general staff investigation into the
20 combat actions of the Kwantung Army, and a study of its
21 operational actions in Manchuria.

22 The report made by the investigation parties
23 headed by HASHIMOTO and by SHIRAKAWA, the other party
24 by SHIRAKAWA, was that the rumors which were afloat
25 in Japan that the army on the spot was ignoring the

1 policies and intentions of the central authorities,
2 or that the younger officers in the Kwantung Army
3 were treating its commanding general as a robot, or
4 that ITAGAKI, ISHIHARA and other staff officers were
5 taking arbitrary action, that all of these rumors
6 were without foundation.

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1 Q As War Minister, had you ever sent out
2 instructions concerning the establishment of a new
3 regime in Manchuria?

4 A My recollection is that after consulting
5 with Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA, both of us sent
6 instructions to Manchuria, Baron SHIDEHARA sending
7 instructions to Japanese diplomatic organs in Man-
8 churia, and I to the army authorities in Manchuria,
9 to the effect that Japanese, all Japanese, whether
10 of the army, whether of the government or civilians in
11 general, should not at all interfere in the internal
12 affairs or movements in Manchuria -- interfere or
13 participate.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

15 MR. COMYNS CARR: Will my friend be so good
16 as to ask the witness which HASHIMOTO he was referring
17 to in the answers he gave a few minutes ago?

18 My friend tells me that the witness did
19 make it clear which HASHIMOTO it was and it is not
20 the accused.

21 Your Honor, with regard to the last question
22 about sending instructions to Manchuria, that has
23 already been stated in examination in chief and in
24 cross-examination. In my submission it is mere
25 repetition to go into it again.

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1 Q In answer to the interrogation of the
2 prosecution, you said that on August 26 you had sent
3 no instructions to that effect -- on September 26.
4 Is there no mistake about that?

5 A It appeared that the question addressed to
6 me by the prosecutor -- that is, I heard the question
7 put to me by the questioner as being related to the
8 monarchical restoration movement in Manchuria, and I
9 said that was not so. It being a very important
10 question, I held very careful consultations with
11 Baron SHIDEHARA on the matter and we wired instructions
12 to our subordinates and representatives in Manchuria,
13 stating implicitly that Japanese must not interfere
14 in the internal movements of Manchuria and that no
15 military administration should be established.

16 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen
17 minutes.

18 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was
19 taken until 1500, after which the proceedings
20 were resumed as follows:)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Witness, before the recess
4 you mentioned your association with SHIDEHARA in
5 connection with the Manchurian Incident. You heard
6 General TANAKA give evidence in this court. Did you
7 hear him say this:

8 "I think it was in the fall of 1935 General
9 MINAMI told me that about the time of the Manchurian
10 Incident he had given expression to a positive opinion
11 with respect to Manchuria reflecting the attitude of
12 the entire army. As a result of this expression of
13 army opinion MINAMI had come into loggerheads with
14 Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA who maintained a passive
15 attitude resulting in friction which extended even
16 to their personal emotions."

17 That appears at page 2019 of the transcript.
18 Continuing on page 2020 TANAKA said:

19 "General MINAMI said that Foreign Minister
20 SHIDEHARA maintained a very passive attitude with
21 respect to the settlement of various pending issues
22 involving Manchuria. On the contrary, General MINAMI
23 representing army opinion advocated a decisive settle-
24 ment of the pending issues from the standpoint of
25 national defense. Because of that fact, whether before

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1 the incident or after the incident, these two men
2 were opposed and constant friction existed between
3 them."

4 What have you to say to that evidence of
5 General TANAKA?

6 THE WITNESS: Before replying to that
7 question from the President may I add a few words to
8 another point which I have failed to explain before?

9 THE PRESIDENT: I prefer you to answer that
10 question from me.

11 THE WITNESS: I deny the TANAKA testimony.
12 That testimony is based entirely upon imagination and
13 TANAKA's personal opinions. The fact is that there
14 was no opposition between SHIDEHARA and me. At that
15 time there was considerable propaganda by the press
16 and by popular rumors in Manchuria that the army was
17 positive and SHIDEHARA passive. Actually at no time
18 was there any friction or controversy between SHIDEHARA
19 and me and even to this day we maintain friendly re-
20 lations, friendly personal relations. The TANAKA
21 testimony is completely groundless. It is based
22 entirely on personal opinions and imaginations of his
23 own. I deny it completely.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Now complete your answer to
25 the question put to you just before the recess.

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1 THE WITNESS: My remark is in connection
2 with the statement I made that I had asked the Chief
3 of the Army General Staff as to how much money was
4 necessary for the dispatch of forces. I am making
5 this additional remark because the impression might
6 have been given because of my lack of sufficient
7 explanation that perhaps the Chief of the Army
8 General Staff brought the matter to the attention of
9 the Throne and received the Imperial sanction thereon.
10 The Emperor does not grant Imperial sanction unless
11 the ideas of the government and the supreme command
12 are one. That point I should like to have under-
13 stood. That is all.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

14
15 BY MR. T. OKAMOTO (Continued):

16 Q There was testimony to the effect that
17 General MINAMI had sent instructions not to establish
18 a military government, a military administration--that
19 is, instructions to the Kwantung Army. Did the
20 Kwantung Army ever breach that order?

21 A No.

22 Q Was the assumption of the mayorship of
23 Mukden a violation of that instruction by DOHIMARA?
24

25 A As a result of the investigation, the in-
vestigations I referred to a little while ago, it was

1 reported to me that DOHIHARA was appointed mayor of
2 Mukden only for the purpose of restoring law and
3 order in Mukden because of the chaotic conditions
4 prevailing there at the time.

5 Q Then the next question is, about the
6 middle of November or about November in 1931 you
7 received a letter from Henry Pu-Yi, didn't you?

8 A Yes.

9 Q With regard to this in this Tribunal you
10 said that it was very interesting. What did you
11 mean by "interesting"?

12 A I was not very much concerned at all with
13 that letter, and I left it alone in a drawer of one
14 of my desks. Some years later when I was cleaning
15 up my drawer I came upon this letter again and then
16 learned for the first time that a man who was formerly
17 an Emperor of China had expressed the view that --
18 expressed indignation over the maladministration of
19 the Chang regime in the Northeastern Provinces and
20 was seeking for a rectification of such a situation.
21 Upon reading it I felt that it was highly interesting
22 that such a thing was written by such a man. That is
23 all I meant by "interesting." I did not interpret
24 the letter to mean anything with regard to independence
25 or separation from China proper but I did want to know

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1 whether the handwriting in which the letter was
2 written was genuine or not and when I found that it
3 was genuine I thought it was very interesting because
4 by the time I knew the contents of the letter an in-
5 dependent state had already been established and that
6 person himself had become the Emperor of that country.

7 Q After being sent to Manchukuo as ambassador
8 from Japan did you have many occasions on which to
9 meet the Emperor of Manchukuo?

10 A Yes, usually and regularly three times a
11 month. That was the schedule.

12 Q On those occasions did you ever bring up
13 this matter of this letter?

14 A No.

15 Q Did you give advice on various matters to
16 the Emperor of Manchukuo directly?

17 A That is entirely public rumor. At these
18 audiences there were only the Emperor of Manchukuo,
19 myself and an interpreter, whom both the Emperor and
20 I implicitly trusted, and these audiences took place
21 in a private drawing room. At these audiences we
22 merely conversed on various topics of the day and
23 indulged in gossip. The Emperor was a rather lonely
24 man and we did not discuss about politics or about
25 national fortunes but about talks of old times, about

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1 literature and found comfort in these conversations.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Carr.

3 MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, these questions
4 in my submission do not arise out of anything in
5 cross-examination. They merely amplify what was in
6 the original affidavit.

7 Q In answer to a question of the prosecutor
8 you said that your advice -- advice was given by you
9 to the State of Manchukuo -- was equivalent to orders;
10 is that correct?

11 THE PRESIDENT: To the interrogator.

12 A There has been no such case.

13 THE PRESIDENT: That is a direct denial, if
14 my recollection is clear. Mr. Comyns Carr put to
15 him an interrogation and he confirmed it. You can
16 contradict me if you wish. I may be wrong. That is
17 my recollection.

18 MR. COMYNS CARR: That is quite correct.

19 THE WITNESS: May I say a word?

20 MR. T. OKAMOTO: Please.

21 THE WITNESS: The question put to me by the
22 prosecutor yesterday was that in connection with the
23 internal guidance of Manchukuo if the Manchukuo
24 government did not comply then you would issue an
25 order, didn't you? At the time the interrogation was

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1 taken I replied to the prosecutor that Japan and
2 Manchukuo talked with each other on an equal basis,
3 mutually on an equal basis, and the prosecutor under-
4 stood my words at that time. Then he asked me, won't
5 you be issuing an order if they did not comply with
6 Japan's desire, and I said in reply that if they did
7 not there may be occasions in which an order might
8 be issued -- might have to be issued -- but that in my
9 time no such orders were ever issued. The fact that
10 no orders were issued during my years there is a
11 fact.

12 Q Did you have any authority to issue such
13 orders even hypothetically?

14 A No.

15 MR. COMYNS CARR: I object, your Honor, to
16 that question. The documents showing his authority
17 are in evidence and his own admission that his views
18 amounted to a directive is also in evidence. This is
19 merely an attempt to get him to contradict the answers
20 he has already given.

21 Q You said as a concrete fact you were against
22 the Concordia Society in Manchuria?

23 A Yes, I said so.

24 Q With regard to that, did you ever send any
25 order to Manchuria or make any representations?

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1 A No, only that I did not positively
2 participate in such matters.

3 Q Did anything happen to the Concordia
4 Society because of your objections, your opposition?

5 A It continued to exist but because of the
6 attitude taken by the commander in chief with respect
7 to that association it did not develop.

8 Q Did you ever say that you had authority
9 to direct military and diplomatic affairs of
10 Manchukuo, absolute powers?

11 A I think I made a very clear reply on that
12 yesterday; that is, in so far as Japan is concerned.
13 That is to say, I said that as the ambassador of
14 Japan in Manchukuo and as the commander in chief of
15 the Kwantung Army I had absolute authority in so far
16 as Japan was concerned. That was the condition that
17 in so far as Japan was concerned Manchukuo itself
18 had its own Foreign Ministry and its own diplomatic
19 service. With those organs I had no connections what-
20 soever.

21 Q Was the special service department and the
22 special service organ the same thing or were they
23 different?

24 A They were different.

25 Q How did they differ?

1 A The special service organ, to put it as
2 simply as possible, is an espionage or intelligence
3 organ. The special service department is in the
4 headquarters of the Kwantung Army and an entirely
5 different thing.

6 Q What were the duties of the special service
7 department?

8 A It was in charge of matters relating to
9 industry and commerce.

10 Q Which is the one that you are said to have
11 abolished?

12 A The special service department in the
13 Kwantung Army. I abolished this department immediately
14 after I assumed my position in Manchukuo with the
15 fear that if it were continued -- if its existence
16 were continued -- it might create various misunder-
17 standings that the Japanese side were interfering
18 in the internal administration of Manchuria.
19
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1 Q Did this special service department ever
2 deal with opium?

3 A No.

4 Q Did the special service organ deal with
5 opium?

6 A Of course not.

7 Q In reply to an interrogation by the prose-
8 cution did you say that to cross the border of
9 Manchuria would be equivalent to crossing the border
10 of Japan -- to cross the Great Wall of Manchuria
11 would be equivalent to crossing the border of Japan,
12 that is respectively? Did you say that?

13 A If I was so understood that is a great
14 mistake. If crossing the border -- if, for instance,
15 crossing the Yalu River, then that would be crossing
16 from Japanese territory into foreign territory, that
17 is into China. From the standpoint of Manchukuo
18 the Great Wall was a border of Manchukuo, but for
19 China, which did not recognize Manchukuo, it was not
20 a border. So it is needless to say that there is a
21 very great difference between the two. The fact
22 that I strictly prohibited the crossing of the Great
23 Wall for the purpose of maintaining law and order
24 in Manchuria is well known to my Chief of Staff
25 NISHIO and Deputy Chief of Staff ITAGAKI, one of

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1 whom is in the dock and the other in Sugamo. A
2 part of the army or some small units of the army
3 may have crossed the border, and I have heard re-
4 ports that that has happened, but as for the
5 Kwantung Army it has never given any orders or any
6 permission to the army to cross the border. This
7 seems to be a good opportunity for me to add a
8 few words by way of explanation.

9 In the course of the preliminary inter-
10 rogations by the prosecution I was asked, "Did not
11 Japan cross the Great Wall?" And in the question
12 from the prosecutor yesterday the same question was
13 asked. It was my strong conviction and policy to
14 prohibit the Kwantung Army from crossing the Great
15 Wall. However, if a small part of the Kwantung Army
16 which happened to pursue bandits which had been
17 creating confusion in Manchuria should cross the
18 border -- one or perhaps ten of our troops may have
19 crossed the border, and that may be interpreted as
20 a dispatch of Kwantung Army forces across the
21 border. But I, to all length, deny that the Kwan-
22 tung Army had ever crossed the Great Wall of China
23 to the other side. I am speaking of this in this
24 sense.
25

Q In the interrogation of the prosecution

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1 did you say that during your tenure as Commander
2 in Chief of the Kwantung Army that Japan occupied
3 all of Manchuria -- or before that?

4 A The word "occupation" or "occupy" is not
5 a very tranquil word. Japan was stationing troops
6 in Manchukuo in accordance with the provisions of
7 the Japan-Manchukuo protocol. The word "occupation"
8 or "occupy" is a highly improper word to use. That
9 is not the case.

10 Q Do you know whether war and incident are
11 the same thing or different?

12 A Yes.

13 Q What are the differences?

14 THE PRESIDENT: He explained them as far
15 as he could. An incident is something that can be
16 settled locally, according to him.

17 Q In reply to an interrogation by the prosecu-
18 tion did you say that an incident was the same as
19 an undeclared war?

20 THE PRESIDENT: He did. Why ask him again?
21 You know he did.

22 Q Is that your true interpretation?

23 THE PRESIDENT: Leave it at that. Do not
24 answer. You are not there to get him to contradict
25 himself. Such re-examination is not allowed.

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1 MR. T. OKAMOTO: There may be some mis-
2 interpretation. So I will take that up with the
3 Language Section later.

4 Q While you were Commander in Chief of the
5 Kwantung Army did you have any military plans
6 against China?

7 A I do not understand the question.

8 Q Did you have any military operations plans
9 against China in the Kwantung Army, that is, while
10 you were Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army?

11 A No.

12 Q What about with regard to the Soviet Union?

13 A We had the plan prepared -- the national
14 defense plan as prepared by the General Staff
15 Headquarters.

16 MR. T. OKAMOTO: May the defendant be
17 shown court exhibit 2437? If the court exhibit in
18 question is not there I ask that he be shown
19 exhibit 1973 first.

20 Q A little while before you said that that
21 was a letter that you had sent to Foreign Minister
22 UGAKI. Is that your seal on there? Is your signa-
23 ture on there, signature and seal on there? You
24 sent this as the Governor-General of Korea.

25 A This letter does not bear my signature nor

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1 my seal, nor is it written in my handwriting. When
2 I saw this letter -- when this letter was shown to
3 me this morning I recollected this: that UGAKI
4 and I were very, very intimate friends and that this
5 letter was sent to him as an extremely personal and
6 private letter, and I asked my secretary to deliver
7 it to him when he, my secretary, went to Tokyo. I
8 had this letter written by my secretary and asked
9 him to deliver it to General UGAKI when he, my
10 secretary, went to Tokyo.
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1 THE PRESIDENT: There is no denial of
2 authorship of the letter.

3 Mr. Comyns Carr.

4 MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, this morn-
5 ing, after long hesitation, the witness admitted
6 in terms that this was his letter. I must object.

7 THE PRESIDENT: He still says the same thing,
8 but that he didn't sign this.

9 MR. COMYNS CARR: I am informed that the
10 original shows, by notes upon it, that it was read
11 by both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister
12 at the time.

13 MR. T. OKAMOTO: What I am trying to make
14 clear now is why MINAMI, after a long hesitation,
15 finally recognized this letter.

16 THE MONITOR: What I am trying to ask is
17 why MINAMI hesitated before acknowledging this
18 letter.

19 THE PRESIDENT: He took so long about it
20 that he must have been sure before he answered.
21 The very hesitation that you emphasized should
22 have secured the correct answer.

23 MR. T. OKAMOTO: May the witness be shown
24 Court exhibit 1973?

25 (Whereupon, a paper was handed to the

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24 Court exhibit 1973?
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(Whereupon, a paper was handed to the

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1 witness.)

2 Q This concerns the sending of prisoners
3 of war to Korea. While you were Governor General
4 in Korea did the Governor General ever take up
5 such matters -- this kind of document?

6 A This is a matter dealt -- handled by the
7 army. I have had no part in it at all.

8 MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, this again
9 is an attempt to get the witness to change clear
10 answers which he gave this morning.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Obviously so, and as a
12 colleague reminds me, this type of examination
13 may be having a disastrous effect on the credi-
14 bility of the witness.

15 Q In speaking of that document the prosecu-
16 tor said that the Chief of Staff of the Korean
17 Army was Major General IBARA. Do you have any
18 recollection of that?

19 A IBARA was not Chief of Staff when I was
20 Governor General of Korea. The Chief of Staff was
21 TANAHASHI, Tan.

22 MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, that is a
23 complete contradiction of what he said this morning.

24 THE WITNESS: Well, I know IBARA, but I
25

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1 made a mistake in identity in connection with the
2 position. The Chief of Staff of the Korean Army
3 at the time I was Governor General was "YAHASHI,
4 Tan.

5 MR. T. OKAMOTO: Despite whether the testi-
6 mony of the witness is authentic or not -- is
7 credible or not, we must treat fact as fact and
8 take it up accordingly, and it is our duty to have
9 the witness bring out the truth.

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1 BY MR. T. OKAMOTO (Continuing):

2 Q As Governor-General of Korea did you ever
3 deal with prisoners-of-war affairs?

4 A As I replied to a question by the prosecutor
5 this morning, I understood from the report from
6 the Director General of Political Affairs of the
7 Governor-General that the Governor-General did what
8 it could when it was asked by the Army if the Gover-
9 nor General could not use its good offices in pro-
10 viding accommodations in the way of buildings for
11 prisoners of war. That is all. --that the Governor
12 General had been consulted by the Army with regard
13 to the provision of accommodations in the way of
14 buildings for prisoners of war.

15 MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, the witness
16 now says that some other person was Chief of Staff
17 than the one he admitted this morning. I would ask
18 that the questions which I put to him about IBARA
19 as to whether IBARA was a truthful person should also
20 be put to him with regard to the individual whom he
21 now says was Chief of Staff.

22 THE PRESIDENT: We will leave it as it is,
23 Mr. Carr.

24 Q Well, is there anything else besides what
25 you said in which you dealt with prisoners-of-war

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1 affairs?

2 A When I mentioned -- I spoke of IBARA this
3 morning I made a mistake in identity. I know IBARA,
4 but the Chief of Staff then was TAKAHASHI, Tan. I
5 do not know TAKAHASHI, Tan's qualifications very
6 well, but I have met him and talked with him several
7 times.

8 THE MONITOR: Not "qualifications" but
9 "I do not know TAKAHASHI too well, but I have talked
10 with him. I have seen him."

11 Q My question was whether the Governor General
12 of Korea had taken part in affairs concerning
13 prisoners of war other than those which you have
14 just related?

15 A Nothing except consultation or request with
16 regard to housing for prisoners of war.

17 Q Do you remember when you became President
18 of the Japan Political Society?

19 A March 30, 1945.

20 Q As President of the Japan Political Society
21 what kind of an attitude did you take toward the war?

22 A When I assumed the post of President of the
23 Association there were clear indications of Japanese
24 defeat; and I thought rather than having to engage
25 in a fight to the last man, something should be done

1 at the proper time to bring the war to an end.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

3 MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, in my sub-
4 mission this does not arise out of the cross-examin-
5 ation at all.

6 THE PRESIDENT: I think it does.

7 We will adjourn until half-past nine
8 tomorrow morning.

9 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment
10 was taken until Thursday, 17 April 1947, at
11 0930.)

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